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Abstract—Location-aware smart phones support various
location-based services (LBSs): users query the LBS server
and learn on the ﬂy about their surroundings. However,
such queries give away private information, enabling the
LBS to identify and track users. We address this problem
by proposing the ﬁrst, to the best of our knowledge, user-
collaborative privacy preserving approach for LBSs. Our
solution, MobiCrowd, is simple to implement, it does not
require changing the LBS server architecture, and it does
not assume third party privacy-protection servers; still,
MobiCrowd signiﬁcantly improves user location-privacy.
The gain stems from the collaboration of MobiCrowd-ready
mobile devices: they keep their context information in a
buffer, until it expires, and they pass it to other users
seeking such information. Essentially, the LBS does not
need to be contacted unless all the collaborative peers in the
vicinity lack the sought information. Hence, the user can
remain hidden from the server, unless it absolutely needs
to expose herself through a query. Our results show that
MobiCrowd hides a high fraction of location-based queries,
thus signiﬁcantly enhancing user location-privacy. To study
the effects of various parameters, such as the collaboration
level and contact rate between mobile users, we develop
an epidemic model. Our simulations with real mobility
datasets corroborate our model-based ﬁndings. Finally,
our implementation of MobiCrowd on Nokia platforms
indicates that it is lightweight and the collaboration cost is
negligible.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart phones, among other increasingly powerful mo-
bile computing devices, offer various methods of local-
ization. Integrated GPS receivers or positioning services
based on nearby communication infrastructure enable
users to position themselves fairly accurately. This gives
rise to a range of Location-Based Services (LBSs):
users can query an LBS server and obtain information
relevant to their current location and surroundings, that
is, contextual data about speciﬁc points of interest. The
value of LBSs is exactly in obtaining accurate and up-
to-date information on the ﬂy.
The ﬂip-side of getting on-site high-quality on-
demand information is the loss of users’ privacy: Each
time an LBS query is submitted, private information is
revealed. The user can be linked to her location, and mul-
tiple pieces of such information can be linked together;
thus, the proﬁling of users becomes possible. Clearly,
the user could forgo the LBS beneﬁts; e.g., she could
download a large data volume and then search locally
about speciﬁc context information. But this would be
cumbersome, if not impractical, and it would be inefﬁ-
cient for obtaining information that changes dynamically
over time.
In order to obtain as much information as possible
about the LBS users, which will be mainly used for
sending targeted advertisement to the users, the service
providers track users over time using various techniques.
For example, the service provider can explicitly ask for
the users’ contact information. However, even if the LBS
does not perform any explicit user identiﬁcation, it is
still possible to ﬁnger-print users of speciﬁc applications
[10], or de-anonymize them (i.e., infer their identity) by
using their IP addresses or location [23], and then trace
their whereabouts.
More importantly, independently of whether the user
is identiﬁed or not, placing too much trust in LBS
providers is undesirable. Indeed, the LBS operators may
be tempted to misuse the rich data they collect, or
they may, as opposed to cellular operators (who have
a contract with their users), share the data with third-
party companies that offer, for example, targeted adver-
tisements. Moreover, the LBS data repositories may be
targeted by attackers, who break into the LBS servers and
obtain logs of user queries. The result in all cases is the
same: user-sensitive data fall in the hands of untrusted
parties.
Tracking the user over time and space, and then
identifying her, implies not only loss of privacy for
the user but possibly other dire consequences such as
absence disclosure: learning that a user is away from
her home could allow a house break-in or blackmail [3].
As a result, the need to enhance privacy for LBS users
has been understood and several solutions have been
proposed. One approach could be to blur the location
information, e.g., by having the user’s smart phone
(or the privacy proxy) submit inaccurate samples to
the LBS server. However, obfuscation approaches (e.g.,
spatial/temporal cloaking introduced in [16]) which can
protect user location-privacy, degrade the user experience
if users need high privacy: e.g., LBS responses would be
inaccurate or untimely. Moreover, obfuscation cannot be
effective against absence disclosure [29]. Another ap-
proach could be to introduce a third party in the system,
acting between the user and the LBS: its role would be
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to protect the users’ privacy. Such an intermediary proxy
server, between the user and the LBS, could anonymize
(and obfuscate) queries by removing any information
that identiﬁes the user or her device [13], [25]. Or it
could blend one query with those of other users, so that
the LBS server always sees a group of queries [24].
However, such approaches only shift the problem: the
threat of an untrustworthy LBS server is addressed by
the introduction of a new third-party server. Some other
approaches require the LBS to change its operation, for
example, by mandating it to process modiﬁed queries
(submitted in different forms than actual queries of the
user), or that it needs to store data differently (e.g.,
encrypted or encoded, to allow private access [14]).
Any such centralized intervention or any substantial
changes to the LBS operation would be hard to adopt,
simply because the LBS providers would have little
incentive to fundamentally change their operation. Mis-
aligned incentives have been identiﬁed as the root of
many security problems [6]. Additionally, new proxy
servers become as attractive for attackers as centralized
LBSs. Hence, the lack of incentives and guarantees for
protecting the users’ location information, make these
approaches infeasible in practice.
In order to enhance the location privacy of LBS users
without any of the above-mentioned limitations, we pro-
pose here a new user-centric scheme. Mobile users con-
cerned about their location privacy are indeed the most
motivated entities to engage in protecting themselves.
Our solution, called MobiCrowd, takes advantage of this
fact, making the privacy-sensitive users responsible for
their own privacy protection. Our approach requires no
change of the LBS server architecture and its normal op-
eration, it makes no assumption on the trustworthiness of
the LBS or any other third-party server, and it enhances
the privacy of mobile users in terms of both presence
and absence disclosure.
MobiCrowd achieves this improvement thanks to a
novel collaborative privacy-protection mechanism: ba-
sically, a user can avoid disclosing her location in-
formation, to the LBS server, if her device can have
its LBS queries answered by nearby peers (i.e., other
reachable user devices) that happen to have the sought
data. Clearly, MobiCrowd would be most effective when
there are many peers gathered at the same location.
Indeed, this clustering phenomenon has been observed in
human mobility studies [27]. Moreover, the places where
people gather are points of interest, where users are most
likely to ask an LBS for information. So, MobiCrowd
would be used exactly where it is most effective.
We analyze our scheme experimentally and analyti-
cally, proposing an epidemic model for the dynamics of
information sharing among users. The model captures
the effect of many users clustering at the same place,
and it can be used to test various “what-if” scenarios
about MobiCrowd. This is a novel approach to evalu-
ate a location-privacy preserving mechanism for mobile
networks: it acts on the parameters of their mobility
model rather than on some speciﬁc location traces. Thus,
we can study the effects of a mixture of parameters
and we can also identify the causes of high or low
location privacy in various settings. We then perform a
simulation on real mobility traces, and we show that the
conclusions from the experimental evaluation verify the
results derived from our model.
The threat of local observers snifﬁng the wireless
channel trying to infer users’ private information, is out
of the scope of this paper; such a threat could exist
with or without MobiCrowd and it can be alleviated
by frequently changing device identiﬁers (e.g., changing
MAC addresses for WiFi networks [18] similar to chang-
ing TMSI for GSM networks [5]). More importantly,
local observers would have a tedious task and still be
ineffective in collecting information: they would need
to be physically present next to any given victim user,
over long periods and across different locations. In
contrast, a centralized LBS can by default observe all
the queries of a user, which is why we focus on this
much greater threat in this paper. However, in order
to secure the scheme against untrustworthy users who
might disseminate invalid or outdated information, the
LBS information package (e.g., the set of points of
interest) is proposed to be self-veriﬁable (i.e., be digitally
signed by the server). In fact, this is the only change that
MobiCrowd imposes on the LBS operation.
Our scheme leverages capabilities of contemporary
smart phones: They can establish ad hoc and infrastruc-
ture connections (e.g., cellular base stations and Wi-Fi
access points). We build a mobile transparent proxy in
each device that protects the users’ location-privacy. Our
proxy, transparently located on-board the user’s device
and between the LBS client and the network, maintains
a buffer with location context information. This buffer
is checked for available data when the user submits a
query. If the valid and up-to-date data is not available,
our mobile proxy broadcasts the query (i.e., the type
of required information) to other nearby devices. If and
only if none of those neighbors can provide the requested
information, is the LBS queried. We have implemented
our scheme on the Nokia N800, N810 and N900 mobile
devices, and demonstrated it with the Maemo Mapper
(a geographical mapping software for points of interest)
[30]. Note that our approach can be ported to the
upcoming technologies that enable mobile devices to
directly communicate to each other via (potentially more
energy-efﬁcient) Wi-Fi-based technologies [1], [2], [4]
that aim at constructing a mobile social network between
mobile users.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
survey the related work in Section II. In Section III,
we state our model, the system assumption, and also the
problem addressed in this paper. We present our scheme
in Section IV, and then we develop an epidemic model
of the MobiCrowd operation in Section V. We evaluate
the effectiveness of MobiCrowd in Section VI, before
we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Techniques proposed to protect location privacy in
LBSs can be classiﬁed based on how they distort the
users’ queries before they arrive at the LBS server.
The queries can be anonymized (by removing users’
identities) or pseudonymized (by replacing users’ real
names with temporal identiﬁers called pseudonyms), or
they can be obfuscated (by generalizing or perturbing
the spatiotemporal information associated to the queries).
They can also be camouﬂaged by adding some dummy
queries, or be completely eliminated and be hidden
from the LBS [28]. Combinations of these methods have
been employed in the existing (centralized or distributed)
mechanisms. The interested reader is referred to [21],
[28] for a more in-depth survey of the research on
location privacy.
The mere anonymization of (especially the continu-
ous) queries does not protect users’ location privacy: the
queries of a user are correlated in space and time, hence,
the adversary can successfully link them by using target
tracking algorithms [17] or identify the real names of
the users [15], [20]. Changing user pseudonyms while
the users are passing through pre-deﬁned spots, called
mix zones [7], makes it difﬁcult to track the users along
their trajectories. However, as users must remain silent
inside the mix zones, so they cannot use the LBS, the
size of the mix zones is kept small in order to let users
beneﬁt from the LBS. Thus, the unlinkability of users’
queries is limited and the adversary’s success is relatively
high, even if the mix zones are optimally placed [12].
Perturbing the query’s spatiotemporal information, in
addition to anonymization by a a third party (central
anonymity server), is proposed for obtaining a higher
level of privacy [13], [24]. The main drawback is the
reliance on a centralized third party that limits its prac-
ticality. The considerable degradation of the quality of
service imposed by the obfuscation methods is another
deterrent for such solutions. For example, in schemes
such as [13], the queries sent to the anonymity server
have to wait until enough anonymization can be achieved
for a group of users (k-anonymity). Similarly in [8], the
need to construct the cloaking regions and also to receive
the responses from the server through other users can
considerably degrade the service. Finally, most of the
obfuscation-based techniques are based on k-anonymity,
which has been shown inadequate to protect (location)
privacy [31], [32].
Adding dummy queries to the user actual queries
might help to confuse the adversary about the actual
user location. But generating effective dummy queries
that divert the adversary is a difﬁcult task [9], as they
need to look like actual queries over space and time. An
optimum algorithm for generating dummy queries is an
open problem.
In all the above-mentioned mechanisms, there is al-
ways a trade-off between users’ privacy and the quality
of service they experience. The tension is maximized
when it comes to hiding queries from the LBS server.
Hiding a query from the server minimizes the revealed
user information, hence, maximizes her privacy with
respect to that query. Simply put, it is more effective
than the other three privacy protection methods, and
it protects users against both presence and absence
disclosure. This is what MobiCrowd provides: Hiding
from the server while receiving the query responses from
other peers.
Finally, there exist cryptographic approaches that re-
design the LBS: the service operator does not learn
much about the users’ queries while it can still reply to
their queries [14], or it can obtain imprecise information
about user location [11]. The lack of incentives for LBS
operators to change their business model and implement
these solutions, and their relatively high computational
overhead have made them impractical so far.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System
We consider a network of location-aware wireless de-
vices, capable of ad hoc device-to-device communication
and of connecting to the wireless infrastructure (e.g.,
cellular and Wi-Fi networks). The users of such devices
leverage on the infrastructure to reach the LBS servers.
Users submit localized search queries, providing in prin-
ciple their current location and the type of information
(context, point of interest, etc) they are interested in.
The server replies to them, providing the latest requested
context information around the submitted location; e.g.,
on businesses, restaurants, gas stations, movie theaters,
ongoing events, or current street trafﬁc. The frequency at
which users query the LBS varies depending on the type
of requested information, the dynamics of information
update in the LBS database, or the geographical region.
We assume that the information the LBS provides is
self-veriﬁable, i.e., users can verify that no entity (e.g.,
a compromised access point) changed the server reply
content.
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B. Adversary
LBS servers concentrate information about all user
queries. Thus, an untrusted service provider could act as
a “big brother,” that is, it could monitor user whereabouts
and activities over time. An honest but curious service
provider could log the user interactions with the server
and share them with other (untrusted) entities for mon-
etary gain, e.g., for targeted advertisement. Moreover,
the concentration of users’ locations and other private
information can attract criminals, who could break into
the service provider network and steal this private in-
formation (with various malicious intentions). It is thus
clear that location privacy is threatened by the LBS
itself, which, at best, facilitates adversarial access to the
user queries (and thus their locations and related private
information). In such a setting, the adversary can be
categorized as a passive global long-term observer, based
on the terminology proposed in [28].
Inference attacks on the observed queries are classiﬁed
into two tightly-related categories: tracking and identi-
ﬁcation attacks. Such attacks can lead to two types of
location-privacy breaches: presence and absence disclo-
sure. In other words, the adversary can learn that a user
is at a given location, or that she is absent from certain
locations, e.g., her home.
The more queries the adversary observes, the higher
its location inference attack success will be. Less in-
formation about user locations makes it harder for the
adversary to reconstruct their actual trajectories and to
identify their real names. This is why protection mech-
anisms try to reduce the adversary’s information. But,
unfortunately, doing so reduces the quality of service
for the user.
C. Design Objectives
Overall, we seek to design a practical and highly ef-
fective location-privacy preserving mechanism for LBSs.
The nature of existing threats, outlined above, is the
determining factor of our design objectives. The LBS
business model itself can be at odds with the need to
protect user privacy: LBS providers may actually need
to proﬁle users’ activities, so that they can use such
knowledge for various monetary purposes. As a result,
the LBS operator may have no incentive to implement
privacy-preserving mechanisms. In contrast, many users
can be sensitive about their privacy. For this reason,
our ﬁrst design objective is to not rely on architectural
changes of the LBS; any such changes (for example, us-
ing private information retrieval techniques [11]) would
be impractical and highly unlikely to be adopted.
Moreover, relying on centralized trusted third parties
(e.g., central anonymity servers) to provide privacy en-
hancing mechanisms can be as hard as having trusted
LBS operators. In fact, as already mentioned, this would
only shift the problem and such assumed trusted third
parties would be new points of failure: once compro-
mised, all users’ information would be leaked to the
adversary. This leads to our second design objective:
no reliance on any third party server to provide pri-
vacy protection. In fact, we would like to place the
privacy protection exactly where there is incentive and
motivation, that is, on the side of the users themselves.
We also want to achieve a high user privacy without
sacriﬁcing LBS quality of service by relying on users’
collaboration.
IV. OUR SCHEME
Based on the stated design objectives, we propose a
novel location-privacy preserving mechanism for LBSs.
To take advantage of the high effectiveness of hiding user
queries from the server, which minimizes the exposed
information about the users’ location to the server, we
propose a mechanism in which a user can hide in the
mobile crowd while using the service.
The rationale behind our scheme is that users who
already have some location-speciﬁc information (origi-
nally given by the service provider) can pass it to other
users who are seeking such information. They can do so
in a wireless peer-to-peer manner, and in this way protect
each other from privacy attacks that the adversary could
perpetrate. Simply put, information about a location can
“remain” around the location it relates to and change
hands several times before it expires. Our proposed
collaborative scheme enables many users to get such
location-speciﬁc information from each other without
contacting the server, hence minimizing the disclosure
of their location information to the adversary.
A. Scheme Details
In order to better understand our model and solution,
consider that the whole area covered by the roaming
mobile users is divided into non-overlapping regions.
Users can obtain context information associated to the
region they ﬁnd themselves in, e.g., obtain a list of
businesses or services (and their latest status), or streets
and intersections (and their trafﬁc information). Users
submit their queries when in place.
In this paper, without loss of generality, we focus
on a single information type provided by the LBS
(e.g., street trafﬁc information, or oil prices in nearby
gas stations, or a list of close-by restaurants). Clearly,
users are interested in multiple types of location-based
contextual information. The LBS server is responsible
for compiling off-line the latest information for each
region and for being ready to respond to the user query.
The integrity and authenticity of the server responses is
protected. This can be done in different ways; in our
system, the user device veriﬁes a digital signature of the
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LBS on each reply using the LBS provider’s public key.
As a result, each piece of context information is self-
veriﬁable: a compromised access point or mobile device
cannot degrade the experience of users by altering replies
or disseminating expired information.
Each piece of information associated with a given
region has an expiration time (which is attached to the
information and protected with the digital signature),
after which the information is no longer valid. Every
mobile device maintains a buffer in which location-
speciﬁc information associated with regions is stored.
This buffer keeps the replies the user obtains from the
server or other peers. As long as a piece of information
is not expired, it is kept in the buffer.
Each user with valid information about a region
is termed informed user. Users interested in getting
location-speciﬁc information about a region are called
information seekers of that region. A seeker, essentially
a user that does not have the sought information in
her buffer, ﬁrst broadcasts her query to her neighbors
through the wireless ad hoc interface of the device. We
term this a local query.
Any of the receivers of such a local query may respond
to it, by what we term a local reply, as long as it has the
information its peer seeks. However, an informed device
will not necessarily respond to any received query: this
will happen if the device is both informed and willing to
collaborate. We design our system with this option for
its users; the collaborative status may be set explicitly
by the user or automatically recommended or set by
the device. Simply put, having each user collaborate a
limited number of times (a fraction of the times she
receives a local query from her neighbors), or during
a randomly selected fraction of time, balances the cost
of helping other peers and caters to the needs of each
user. In practice, this is equivalent to the case where only
a fraction of users collaborate.
By obtaining a local reply, the seeker is now informed
while, more importantly, her query has remained hidden
from the service provider. No privacy-sensitive informa-
tion has been exposed to the server and the user has
obtained the sought service. Of course, in case there is
no informed user around the seeker to assist her, she has
no choice but to contact the server directly. In essence, a
subset of users in every region have to contact the LBS
to get the updated information, and the rest of the users
beneﬁt from the peer-to-peer collaboration. Intuitively,
the higher the proportion of hidden user queries, the
higher her location privacy will be.
V. THE EPIDEMIC MODEL
The performance of our system depends on various pa-
rameters, such as the frequency of contacts and the level
of collaboration between users, the rate of query genera-
tion, etc. We now describe a model for MobiCrowd, with
the help of which we can directly see the effect of various
parameters on desired performance metrics. Observing
the effect of the parameters helps when designing a
system and testing “what-if” scenarios. For example, we
can immediately see the level of collaboration required to
achieve a desired privacy level or how the privacy level
will change if the users make queries more frequently
or less frequently.
We draw an analogy between our system and epidemic
phenomena: location-context information spreads as an
infection from one user to another, depending on the
user state (seeking information, having valid information,
etc.). For example, a seeker becomes “infected” when
meeting an “infected” user, that is, a user with valid
information.
We want a model that describes transitions between
and keeps track of the various states a user is in at each
point in time. However, the complexity of keeping track
of each individual user state is prohibitive. Therefore,
we make use of the mean ﬁeld approximation [22],
which focuses on the fraction of users in each state;
these fractions are collectively called the network state.
The approximation applies when the number of users
is large and each individual interaction contributes a
vanishingly small change to the network state. Also,
the approximation requires a random contact pattern
among users, rather than a spatially correlated pattern,
and random contacts are not far from reality when users
are clustered in the same area.
The mean ﬁeld approximation tells us that the time
evolution of the fraction of users in each state can
be described with increasing accuracy, as the number
of users grows, by a system of Ordinary Differential
Equations (ODEs). By studying the system of ODEs, we
ﬁnd to what steady state(s) the network may converge
to. Similar models have been used in epidemics [19], in
worm propagation in wireless [33] networks, and also in
research on forwarding/gossiping protocols [34].
To keep the presentation simple we focus on one type
of context information, that is, we consider a single av-
erage information lifetime. No loss of generality results
from this, because, to model a complete system with
multiple types of information, we can merge multiple
versions of this model, one for each type.
A. MobiCrowd: Model States and System of ODEs
As mentioned earlier, users move in an area par-
titioned into multiple regions. The state of context
knowledge within a region intuitively corresponds to
the disease status in an epidemic. In general, a user’s
knowledge state would be multi-dimensional, because
it is different for each region. Hence, for each region
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we would have an associated epidemic model, with the
same structure but different parameters. However, the
state of knowledge about a region is unrelated to the
knowledge about other regions, so different regions can
be analyzed separately. We focus on a single region, with
users entering and exiting it, and we describe the states
and the dynamics of our epidemic model for that single
region. The mobility of users with respect to a region
is modeled using three parameters: β that is the average
number of times a user have a proximity contact with
other users at a time instant within a region, μ that is the
average number of users who enter a region at a time
instant, and λ that is the average number of users who
leave a region at a time instant. The parameters of the
epidemic model are listed in Table I.
Seeker: Users who are inside the region and are
interested in obtaining information (i.e., have requested
the information but not yet received it) are in the Seeker
state. Once they have it, they move into the Informed
state. Users can receive information from other Informed
users in the region, or from the server, the ultimate
source of information.
Informed: Users who have information about the
region are in the Informed state. If they are inside the
region, they (called Informed Insiders) accept to spread
the information at each contact with a Seeker with
probability φ. This is because the information spreading
process imposes some communication cost on Informed
users and, hence, they do not always collaborate. If they
are outside the region, we assume they (called Informed
Outsiders) do not spread the information (as nobody asks
for it). The information that the Informed users have,
whether they are inside or outside the region, expires
with rate δ and the users become Removed.
Removed: Users who do not have information and
are not interested in obtaining information are in the
Removed state. We distinguish between Insider Removed
and Outsider Removed users. An Insider Removed user
becomes a Seeker if the user becomes interested in
obtaining information about the region. We assume that
outsiders have to enter the region to become interested.
We denote by S(t), I(t), I∗(t), R(t), and R∗(t),
respectively, the fraction of Seeker, Informed Insider,
Informed Outsider, Removed Insider, and Removed Out-
sider users of a given region at time t. The network state
y(t) is the vector of these values. The time dependence
will not be explicitly given in the rest of the paper. The
system of equations that models the evolution of the
network state is
S + I + I∗ +R+R∗ = 1 (1a)
d
dt
S = γR− (βφI + ω)S (1b)
d
dt
I = (βφI + ω)S − δI + μI∗ − λI (1c)
d
dt
I∗ = −δI∗ + λI − μI∗ (1d)
d
dt
R = −γR+ δI + μR∗ − λR (1e)
d
dt
R∗ = δI∗ − μR∗ + λR (1f)
0 ≤ S, I, I∗, R,R∗ ≤ 1. (1g)
We write this system succinctly as d
dt
y = F (y). We
study the stationary regime of the system, i.e., the regime
where, for t −→ ∞, the network state does not change
with time. In particular, we look for equilibrium points of
the system, i.e., network states at which d
dt
y = 0. Setting
F (y) = 0 and solving for y, we reach the following
nonlinear system:
I =
ωS
a− βφS
(2a)
I∗ =
λ
μ+ δ
I (2b)
R =
βφI + ω
γ
S (2c)
R∗ =
1
μ
(
λδ
μ+ δ
I + λ
βφI + ω
γ
S
)
(2d)
βφS2 − cS + a = 0, (2e)
where
a = δ
(
1 +
λ
μ+ δ
)
(3)
c = a+ βφ+ ω
(
1 +
λ
μ+ δ
(1 +
δ
μ
) +
a
γ
(1 +
λ
μ
)
)
.
(4)
Having expressed all variables in terms of S, we need
to solve the quadratic equation (2e) for S, keeping in
mind that any solution has to satisfy 0 ≤ S ≤ 1.
The value of S0 can be found from the quadratic
formula:
S0 =
1
2βφ
(
c−
√
c2 − 4aβφ
)
(5)
Then, we can substitute S0 into (2a)-(2d) to ﬁnd out the
other values I0, I∗0 , R0, R∗0.
So, we found the only admissible equilibrium point
of the network. We now give a sufﬁcient condition
for this point to be locally asymptotically stable, that
is, all system trajectories starting near enough to the
equilibrium point will eventually converge to it without
wandering too far away in the meantime. This condition
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S(t) Seeker users at time t
I(t) insider Informed users at time t
I∗(t) outsider Informed users at time t
R(t) insider Removed users at time t
R∗(t) outsider Removed users at time t
λ rate of exiting the region per time unit
μ rate of entering the region per time unit
β contact rate per user per time unit
γ avg request rate per user per time unit
1/ω avg waiting time before contacting the server
1/δ information avg lifetime
φ avg collaboration probability
TABLE I
LIST OF THE SYMBOLS USED IN THE EPIDEMIC MODEL
is that the Jacobian matrix of the system, evaluated at the
equilibrium point, has eigenvalues with strictly negative
real parts. Note that, instead of using the differential
equation for R∗, we substitute R∗ = 1−S− I− I∗−R
and compute the Jacobian of an equivalent system with
only the 4 variables S, I, I∗, R. The Jacobian J(S, I) is⎛
⎜⎜⎝
−βφI − ω −βφS 0 γ
βφI + ω βφS − δ − λ μ 0
0 λ −μ− δ 0
−μ δ − μ −μ −γ − λ− μ
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
(6)
which, as we see, is only a function of S and I . The
eigenvalues of J(S, I) evaluated at the equilibrium point
can be found by solving the 4th order equation
|J(S0, I0)− xI4| = 0 (7)
for x, where I4 is the 4×4 unit matrix. As we have men-
tioned, if all the solutions have a strictly negative real
part, then the equilibrium point is locally asymptotically
stable.
Moreover, if all the solutions have a strictly negative
real part, the equilibrium point persists under small
perturbations of the system. That is, if v(y) is any smooth
vector ﬁeld on R4, then for sufﬁciently small  the
equation
d
dt
y = F (y) + v(y) (8)
has an equilibrium point near the original one, and the
equilibrium point of the perturbed system is also locally
asymptotically stable.
In Section VI, we show that all the eigenvalues
have strictly negative real part for the range of system
parameters we consider; hence, the equilibrium point is
stable, and it persists under small perturbations.
B. Baseline scenario: No collaboration
To be able to isolate the effect of collaboration, we
study the case where there is no collaboration among
users: A user who becomes interested checks her buffer,
and if the content is not there, she immediately contacts
the server. Thus, there are no S users in the model for
this case:
I + I∗ +R +R∗ = 1 (9a)
d
dt
I = γR+ μI∗ − (λ+ δ)I (9b)
d
dt
I∗ = λI − (μ+ δ)I∗ (9c)
d
dt
R = δI + μR∗ − (λ+ γ)R (9d)
d
dt
R∗ = δI∗ + λR− μR∗ (9e)
0 ≤ I, I∗, R,R∗ ≤ 1. (9f)
We compute the equilibrium point of the system, and
study its stability as before.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate the effectiveness of MobiCrowd in hid-
ing user queries from the server, thus protecting their
location privacy. First, we deﬁne a measure of the user
privacy. Next, we simulate MobiCrowd on a dataset of
realistic mobility traces and we compare the simulation
results with the numerical results obtained from the epi-
demic model. Finally, we describe our implementation
of MobiCrowd on the Nokia devices, and we present
measurement results.
A. Privacy Gain
We quantify the privacy in a given region as the
fraction of queries per time unit that are not observed
by the server. This measure is inversely proportional
to the adversary’s success rate in performing inference
attacks on the observed queries. This metric shows the
reduction in the amount of information the adversary
obtains from the users’ queries compared to the case
where users directly contact the server for each query.
1) MobiCrowd with no collaboration (relying on
the buffer): In the case of no collaboration among users,
which we use as a baseline scenario, the users can
retrieve the information either from their buffer, or from
the server. Only the I users have the information in their
buffers, whereas the R users are forced to contact the
server when they become interested. The I users ask
queries at a total rate of γI , and the R users at a total
rate of γR. Therefore, the privacy gain in this case is
PG0 = I/(I +R) (10)
where I and R are computed from (9).
2) MobiCrowd with collaboration: When the users
collaborate with probability φ > 0, queries can also
be answered by peers, which happens at a total rate
of βφIS. Queries are answered by the server at a total
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rate of ωS. The total rate of asked queries is, as before,
γR+ γI . Therefore, the privacy gain in this case is
PGφ = 1−
ωS
γR+ γI
=
βφIS + γI
γR+ γI
. (11)
Observe that βφIS is always smaller than γR (see
Eq. (2c)), so the privacy is at most equal to 1, as it
should be. The values of S, I and R are computed from
(2).
B. Simulation Setup
In order to validate our model, we compare our nu-
merical evaluations with simulation results. The location
traces that we use belong to 509 randomly chosen
mobile users (vehicles) from the epﬂ/mobility dataset at
CRAWDAD [26]. We set the time unit of the simulation
to 5 minutes and we consider the users’ locations at
integer multiples of the time unit, hence synchronizing
all the traces. We consider a division of the Bay Area
into 10 × 25 equal-size regions. Two nodes in a region
are considered to be neighbors of each other if they
are within 100m of each other (using WiFi). We run
our simulation for 100 times on the mobility traces and
compute the average of the results.
For each region, we compute λ, μ, and β from the data
set. These values are plugged into the epidemic model in
order to ﬁnd the solutions of (2) and (9). We compute the
privacy gain according to the simulation and the numeri-
cal analysis for φ = {0.2, 1}, 1/δ = {1, 4, 7, ..., 28}, and
γ = {0.1, 0.2, ..., 1}. The average waiting time before
contacting the server 1/ω is set to 1. For all combinations
of these parameters, the eigenvalues of the Jacobians of
(1) and (9) are negative, which indicates the stability of
the equilibrium points of our epidemic model in these
cases.
As it is not possible to plot the results for all the
regions, we compute, as a representative example, the
privacy gain in one region, located in downtown San
Francisco. It has a higher concentration of points of
interest, and 90 users are present in it on average. The
rate μ of entering the region is 4.18 users per time unit,
and the exiting rate λ is 4.22 users per time unit. The
average contact rate β is 51.89 per user per time unit. In
order to put the results from this region in perspective,
we also measure the privacy of users across their entire
trajectory, spanning multiple regions.
In the simulation we quantify the privacy gain using
directly the deﬁnition (fraction of queries hidden from
the LBS server), and for the numerical evaluation we
use (10) and (11). We still use the notation PG0 and
PGφ to refer to the location privacy gain of using Mo-
biCrowd, without collaboration and with collaboration
φ, respectively.
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Fig. 1. User location privacy for the region under study (in downtown
San Francisco). The ﬁrst row illustrates privacy of users without
collaboration, when they only rely on buffering information. The
second and the third rows show user privacy using MobiCrowd, for
different collaboration factors φ = 0.2 and φ = 1, respectively. The
left column shows the numerical results whereas the right column
shows the simulation results.
C. Results
Fig. 1 illustrates the users’ location-privacy using
MobiCrowd with and without collaboration (PGφ and
PG0) in the studied region. The results of simulation and
numerical evaluation are displayed side by side, in order
to enable us to verify the validity of our epidemic model.
The qualitative and also quantitative match between the
simulation and the model enables us to rely on our
epidemic model to evaluate users’ location-privacy in a
very computationally efﬁcient way in complex scenarios
dealing with large networks.
All the plots conﬁrm a general pattern of privacy gain
increase as the information lifetime or the request rate
increases. With either kind of increase, users retrieve
with higher probability non-expired information either
from their own buffer or from their peers; hence, a higher
fraction of their queries will be hidden from the LBS.
Moreover, the privacy gain for long lifetimes and low
request rate values (i.e., long intervals between requests)
appears to be more or less the same as the privacy gain
for short lifetimes and high request rate values (i.e.,
short intervals between requests), as indicated by the
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Fig. 2. Overall users’ location-privacy using MobiCrowd across all
regions, obtained by simulation.
vaulted shape of the privacy gain contours. Also, adding
collaboration to the buffering technique in MobiCrowd
increases the fraction of hidden queries even for a
collaboration factor of φ = 0.2.
We observe these patterns in Fig. 1 which shows very
high correlation between our epidemic model with the
simulation of MobiCrowd on a realistic dataset. Even
quantitatively, both sets of graphs match to a great extent.
This proves the validity of our model in estimating users
privacy gain even for the real scenarios where the contact
rate between users changes over time.
Fig. 2 shows the simulation results for the users’
privacy across their entire trajectory (over all the regions
they visit) averaged over all the users. As we expect,
increasing the collaboration probability increases user
privacy, and the dependence on the information lifetime
and the request rate is as we observed before in Fig. 1.
In Fig. 3, we see, again for the overall user privacy, the
relative additional privacy gain we obtain by combining
collaboration and buffering, compared to relying only
on buffering. The relative added value of collaboration
is computed as (PGφ − PG0)/PG0. So, for example,
0.5 on the plot means 50% increase in privacy gain.
We observe, ﬁrst of all, that higher collaboration
(going from φ = 0.2 to φ = 1) implies higher relative
added value. What is more interesting, however, is that
the relative privacy gain of collaboration increases as we
go from the high-lifetime, high-request-rate part to the
short-lifetime, small-request-rate part. In the former part,
the effect of buffering dominates the privacy gain: The
information does not expire quickly, so users retrieve it
from their buffers, and so collaboration does not add
much. Still, we observe relative gains of 10% even for
low collaboration probability φ = 0.2. In the latter
part, however, the effect of collaboration dominates the
achieved privacy, as buffering does not help much when
the information lifetime is short: Increasing collaboration
from 0.2 to 1 results in an increase of up to 500%.
Summing up, buffering and collaboration complement
each other in increasing user location-privacy.
The delay until receiving a response may be higher
or lower with MobiCrowd: it depends on the implemen-
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Fig. 3. Overall users’ relative location-privacy gain of collaboration
with respect to buffering in MobiCrowd across all regions, i.e.,
(PGφ − PG0)/PG0, obtained by simulation.
tation of the LBS, its workload at the time the query
is sent, the available transmission capacity of the smart-
phones, and, above all, it depends on the state of the
information in their buffer. In Section VI-D, we provide
some information about the communication delay of
MobiCrowd on Nokia devices.
D. Implementation
We implemented MobiCrowd on three different Nokia
mobile devices (N800, N810, and N900). We built a
mobile privacy proxy that runs in each device. The
proxy does not require any modiﬁcation of the supported
applications and it is transparent to their operation. The
prototype works with the Maemo Mapper LBS and
MobiCrowd acts as a HTTP transparent proxy to which
the client trafﬁc is redirected. Note that knowing the
format of the LBS queries and the data format of the
server replies is enough to adapt MobiCrowd to new LBS
applications (i.e., to parse the user queries and check
whether the answer is in the buffer). Our implementation
in Python (including the proxy module, ad-hoc network-
ing module, and the server interface module) is 600 lines
of code and the memory utilization does not exceed 3%
of the total memory of the used devices.
We performed measurements to estimate the delay to
obtain a peer response. The setting was a lab environ-
ment with 5 devices, 3 out of which were randomly
chosen to collaborate each time. There were four POIs,
and the size of the responses was 600 bytes. We av-
erage measurements over 100 queries. In our setting,
the mobiles accessed the LBS server over a cellular
link (e.g., GSM), and they communicated with other
mobiles via the WiFi interface. The average delay was
0.17sec. We also note that cryptographic delays are (for
a typical OpenSSL distribution) low: the weakest of
the three devices, the N800, can verify more than 460
RSA signatures per second (1024 bit), or 130 signature
veriﬁcation per second (for 2048 bit modulus); this
implies that digitally signed LBS response can be easily
handled by the devices to protect against malicious peers.
A popular technique that enhances privacy against lo-
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cal eavesdroppers is to change the identiﬁers frequently.
For example, in cellular networks the network operators
are in charge of changing the TMSI when users move
from one location area (a set of adjacent cells) to another.
Thus, cellular networks make use of network-issued
pseudonyms to protect the location-privacy of their users
[5]. MobiCrowd-ready mobile devices can also mimic
this defense (as has already been proposed for wireless
networks, e.g., [18]). They can change their identiﬁers
(e.g., the MAC addresses) as often as desired, even while
in a single point-of-interest area. This would essentially
root out any threat by any curious local observer. Even
in the case of a stalker, it would not be possible to link
the successive identiﬁers of a device to that device, as
multiple users’ identiﬁers will be mixed together. The
only remaining option for the stalker is to maintain visual
contact with the target user, but defending against this
threat is clearly orthogonal to our problem.
Finally, our implementation allows the user to tune
parameters (e.g., collaboration level).
VII. CONCLUSION
We propose a novel approach to enhance the pri-
vacy of LBS users, aiming against service providers
who could extract information from their LBS queries
and misuse it. We develop and evaluate MobiCrowd, a
scheme that allows LBS users to reduce their exposure
while they continue to receive the location context infor-
mation they need. MobiCrowd achieves this by leverag-
ing on peer collaboration: the user can get information
from nearby users and can thus avoid getting exposed
to the LBS server. Users, as opposed to the LBS server,
have both the incentive and the capability to safeguard
their privacy, thus they should be the ones responsible for
it. Our analysis shows a signiﬁcant improvement thanks
to MobiCrowd, whose light-weight implementation we
demonstrate in three mainstream portable devices.
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